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Privileging Opinion, Denigrating 
Discourse: How the Law of Defamation 






This Article examines how defamation law promotes a culture of 
hyperbole and exaggeration on television news talk shows at the expense of 
more meaningful dialogue and discourse.  The Article uses the 2020 federal 
court rulings in McDougal v. Fox News Network, LLC and Herring 
Networks, Inc. v. Maddow as analytical springboards to address this 
problem.  In both cases, judges dismissed defamation claims stemming from 
comments made by well-known talk-show hosts—Fox News’s Tucker 
Carlson in McDougal and MSNBC’s Rachel Maddow in Herring 
Networks—on the ground that their remarks would not be understood by 
viewers as factual assertions.  In concluding that Carlson’s and Maddow’s 
statements amounted to nonactionable expressions of opinion, the judges 
evaluated the nature of news talk shows and reasoned that they constitute 
venues where viewers today expect bombast and bluster.  While the 
outcomes are laudable for safeguarding political opinions, they are highly 
problematic for a democratic society because they incentivize hyperbole 
over rational discussion of political topics that affect voters’ decisions.  In 
brief, Carlson and Maddow are allowed to cast aspersions and then to claim 
in their defense that no one would believe them as factual assertions.  The 
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more hosts ratchet up the level of rhetoric on their shows and cultivate 
reputations for bloviation, the more likely they are to successfully defend 
against defamation lawsuits.  This Article argues that courts in future 
defamation cases should consider news talk shows on a program-by-
program basis rather than continue to flesh out a nascent, genre-based 
presumption that news talk shows as a whole trade in protected opinions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In September 2020, a federal court dismissed a defamation case against 
Fox News Network stemming from talk-show host Tucker Carlson’s 
assertion that former Playboy model Karen McDougal had engaged in “a 
classic case of extortion” against President Donald J. Trump.1  In tossing out 
McDougal’s lawsuit, United States District Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil 
deemed the accusation “nonactionable hyperbole,”2 rather than a provably 
false factual assertion of criminal activity that would have allowed the claim 
to proceed.3  In brief, it fell on the opinion side of the often blurry line in 
defamation law separating protected opinions from actionable facts.4 
Judge Vyskocil’s conclusion, standing alone, is neither intriguing nor 
groundbreaking.  After all, it is well established that rhetorical hyperbole is 
shielded from liability in defamation law.5  Such speech is safeguarded 
“because the language used is so expansive that the reader or listener knows 
it is only an opinion, that it is not an assertion of fact.”6  Furthermore, the 
outcome was unsurprising because the United States Supreme Court already 
had determined that words similar to extortion, such as “blackmail”7 and 
“scab,”8 are protected when loosely deployed. 
 
 1. McDougal v. Fox News Network, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
24, 2020). 
 2. Id. at *16. 
 3. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1990) (noting that “a statement on 
matters of public concern must be provable as false before there can be liability under state 
defamation law,” and adding that “a statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which 
does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection”); see 
also Moldea v. New York Times Co., 22 F.3d 310, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (observing that “an 
accusation of criminal conduct is a classic libel”). 
 4. See Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation: Libel, Slander and Related Problems § 4:1, at 4–3 
to 4–4 (5th ed. 2017) (“No task undertaken under the law of defamation is more elusive than 
distinguishing between fact and opinion.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Sindi v. El-Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2018) (“Statements that are merely 
‘imaginative expression’ or ‘rhetorical hyperbole’—in other words, statements that ‘no reasonable 
person would believe presented facts’—are not actionable.”  (quoting Levinsky’s, Inc. v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, 127 F.3d 122, 128 (1st Cir. 1997)); Pierson v. Nat’l Inst. for Labor Rels. Research, 319 F. 
Supp. 3d 1100, 1108 (N.D. Ind. 2018) (“Rhetorical hyperbole is a well-recognized category of 
‘privileged defamation.’”) (quoting Dilworth v. Dudley, 75 F.3d 307, 309 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 6. Clay Calvert, Daniel V. Kozlowski & Derigan Silver, Mass Media Law 237 (21st ed. 2020). 
 7. See Greenbelt Coop. Pub. Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (concluding that “even the 
most careless reader must have perceived that the word [blackmail] was no more than rhetorical 
hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered Bresler’s negotiating position extremely 
unreasonable”). 
 8. See Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 
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What is notable, however, about Judge Vyskocil’s analysis in McDougal 
v. Fox News Network LLC9 is that it adds to growing judicial recognition 
that statements uttered on news-oriented talk shows should be presumptively 
discounted by viewers as bluster and bombast.10  As Judge Vyskocil put it 
when discussing Fox News’s “Tucker Carlson Tonight” program, the 
“‘general tenor’ of the show should . . . inform a viewer that he is not 
‘stating actual facts’ about the topics he discusses and is instead engaging in 
‘exaggeration’ and ‘non-literal commentary.’”11  She deemed persuasive Fox 
News Network’s argument “that given Mr. Carlson’s reputation, any 
reasonable viewer ‘arrive[s] with an appropriate amount of skepticism’ 
about the statements he makes.”12  Judge Vyskocil added that a 
determination of rhetorical hyperbole is especially likely “in the context of 
commentary talk shows like the one at issue here, which often use 
‘increasingly barbed’ language to address issues in the news.”13 
This logic is extremely important.  It provides a legal incentive for news 
talk shows to ramp up their general level of bloviation and exaggeration in 
order to defend against defamation lawsuits.  In a nutshell, and as the title of 
this Article connotes, cases such as McDougal laudably protect and privilege 
political opinions but, in doing so, they also exacerbate the erosion of 
meaningful dialogue and discourse on news talk shows by incentivizing 
hyperbole.  Bluntly stated, Tucker Carlson’s brand of political discussion 
allows him to cast aspersions and then to claim no one would believe them 
as factual statements.14  Or, as Hollywood Reporter legal correspondent Eriq 
 
285–86 (1974) (concluding that “Jack London’s ‘definition of a scab’ is merely rhetorical hyperbole, 
a lusty and imaginative expression of the contempt felt by union members towards those who refuse 
to join"). 
 9. 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2020). 
 10. As addressed below, McDougal follows closely on the heels of another federal district court 
decision, Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow, 445 F. Supp. 3d 1042 (S.D. Cal. 2020), involving a 
defamation case stemming from comments uttered by the host of a cable news channel talk show.  
See infra notes 21–30 and accompanying text (addressing Herring Networks). 
 11. McDougal, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, at *17 (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 
U.S. 1, 20–21 (1990); Levinsky's, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 128 (1st Cir. 1997)). 
 12. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 600 W. 115th Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 603 N.E.2d 930, 936 
(1992)). 
 13. Id. at *14 (citing Rodney A. Smolla, 1 Law of Defamation § 6:92 (2d ed. 2020)). 
 14. As one newspaper tidily encapsulated the latter part of this principle in reporting on Judge 
Vyskocil’s ruling, “Mr. Carlson’s viewers may not necessarily believe everything they hear.” 
Michael M. Grynbaum & Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Karen McDougal’s Defamation Suit Against 
Fox News is Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/24/ 
business/media/tucker-carlson-karen-mcdougal-lawsuit.html. 
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Gardner rather wryly wrote in summing up the ruling, “[d]on’t always 
mistake what Tucker Carlson says for fact.”15  Indeed, Judge Vyskocil 
reasoned that Carlson’s “overheated rhetoric is precisely the kind of pitched 
commentary that one expects when tuning in to talk shows like Tucker 
Carlson Tonight, with pundits debating the latest political controversies.”16  
The irony of Fox News Network’s defense here is readily apparent: 
Statements made on a news channel should not be trusted or treated as 
factual.17 
To be clear, Judge Vyskocil did not go so far to as to hold that the 
extortion accusation was an opinion solely because it was leveled on Tucker 
Carlson Tonight.  The nature of Carlson’s program, instead, was one facet of 
a larger contextual picture.  That broader framework included: 
1) the fact that “accusations of crimes [such as extortion] . . . are 
unlikely to be defamatory when, as here, they are made in connection with 
debates on a matter of public or political importance;”18 
2) Carlson’s statements, both before and after the extortion allegation, 
suggested he was pointing out apparent hypocrisy;19 and 
3) what Judge Vyskocil called “disclaimers” uttered by Carlson, 
including openly casting doubt on his own source for the extortion 
allegation—former Trump attorney Michael Cohen—and Carlson’s use of 
the modifying phrase “sounds like” immediately prior to uttering “a classic 
case of extortion.”20 
Significantly, McDougal was not the only 2020 defamation case 
involving a talk show on a cable news channel in which a judge pointed to 
the nature of the program as a key factor for holding that a statement was 
protected opinion.  Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow21 centered on a claim 
by the owner of the heavily conservative-leaning One America News 
 
 15. Eriq Gardner, Fox News Beats Lawsuit Over Tucker Carlson’s “Extortion” Analogy, 
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/fox-news-beats-
lawsuit-over-tucker-carlsons-extortion-analogy. 
 16. McDougal, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, at *19. 
 17. As the author of this Article told Washington Post media critic Erik Wemple, there is “more 
than a small dose of irony in arguing in your defense that what you are stating on a news network is 
not factual.”  Erik Wemple, The Recklessness of Tucker Carlson, WASH. POST (June 26, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/26/recklessness-tucker-carlson/. 
 18. McDougal, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, at *14. 
 19. Id. at *15 
 20. Id. at *18. 
 21. 445 F. Supp. 3d 1042 (S.D. Cal. 2020). 
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Network (“OAN”) against MSNBC talk-show host Rachel Maddow.22  
During a July 2019 segment of The Rachel Maddow Show, the eponymous 
host asserted that OAN is “the most obsequiously pro-Trump right wing 
news outlet in America [and] really literally is paid Russian propaganda.”23  
United States District Judge Cynthia Bashant concluded that the “really 
literally is paid Russian propaganda” assertion was protected opinion and 
she dismissed the complaint.24 
In reaching that determination, she addressed several variables, 
including the forum of the The Rachel Maddow Show.25  The judge noted 
that while viewers of news channels want facts, “Maddow made the 
allegedly defamatory statement on her own talk show news segment where 
she is invited and encouraged to share her opinions with her viewers.”26  In 
brief, Judge Bashant drew a pivotal boundary separating a newscast from a 
news talk show, with the former providing a venue where one expects facts 
and the latter offering a location where one anticipates opinions.27  The 
“medium” of a news talk show, to use Judge Bashant’s term, thus made “it 
more likely that a reasonable viewer would not conclude that the contested 
statement implies an assertion of objective fact.”28  That holding is not 
surprising, particularly given that Maddow delivers remarks on her show in 
a format that one media critic calls “sarcasm news,” replete with “ironic 
Maddowian intonations.”29  The case is now on appeal to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with an attorney for Herring Networks 
 
 22. See Erik Wemple, Vanity Fair ‘Updates’ Story About Donald Trump Jr., OAN, WASH. POST 
(May 9, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/05/09/vanity-fair-updates-story-
about-donald-trump-jr-oan/ (contending that OAN “takes a back seat to no one—not even Fox 
News’s ‘Hannity’—when it comes to jaw-dropping innovations in pro-Trump news coverage”). 
 23. Herring Networks, 445 F. Supp. 3d at 1046. 
 24. Id. at 1054.  
 25. In addition to addressing the forum of the The Rachel Maddow Show, the court also 
considered: 1) the nature of the entire segment in which Maddow made her allegedly defamatory 
remarks, and 2) the specific context of the “language surrounding the allegedly defamatory 
statement” by Maddow, including the fact that Maddow was openly drawing much of her views 
from a Daily Beast article that described how a reporter for OAN was also being paid for her work 
with a Russian propaganda outlet called Sputnik.  Id. at 1051–53. 
 26. Id. at 1049. 
 27. See id. at 1050 (opining that “Maddow’s show is different than a typical news segment where 
anchors inform viewers about the daily news.  The point of Maddow’s show is for her to provide the 
news but also to offer her opinions as to that news”). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Alissa Quart, The Sarcastic Times, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Mar./Apr. 2009), 
https://archives.cjr.org/essay/the_sarcastic_times.php?page=all. 
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contending that “[t]he words—’that OAN is really literally paid Russian 
propaganda’—do not convey an opinion.  This is a blatant defamatory 
falsehood.”30 
This Article initially explains in Part II how the decisions in both 
McDougal and Herring Networks: 1) fully comport with the principle that 
opinions about politics and matters of public concern are privileged in First 
Amendment31 jurisprudence, and 2) square with the notion that context is 
key when determining if a statement is one of fact or opinion.32  Part III then 
argues that despite such congruency with extant legal principles, McDougal 
and Herring Networks unfortunately foster a communicative environment on 
news talk shows that encourages—maybe even values—”overheated 
rhetoric,”33 “exaggeration”34 and “colorful commentary”35 by transforming 
those communicative characteristics into a key facet of an opinion defense 
against defamation lawsuits targeting comments by the hosts of such 
programs.36  In other words, just as courts today in defamation cases hold 
that audiences should expect opinions and hyperbole when speech is 
conveyed in online social media fora,37 so too should the viewers of 
 
 30. Press Release, Herring Networks, Inc., One America News Elevates $10 Million Defamation 
Lawsuit Against Rachel Maddow and MSNBC to Ninth Circuit, OAN (June 3, 2020), 
https://www.oann.com/one-america-news-elevates-10-million-defamation-lawsuit-against-rachel-
maddow-and-msnbc-to-ninth-circuit/ (emphasis omitted).  See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 29, 
Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow, No. 20-55579 (9th Cir. Oct. 12, 2020) (“Maddow’s show is not 
mere political punditry.”). 
 31. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The Free 
Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated ninety-five years ago through the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties applicable for governing the actions of 
state and local government entities and officials.  See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) 
(finding “that freedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment 
from abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected 
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States”). 
 32. See infra Part II. 
 33. McDougal v. Fox News Network, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, *19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
24, 2020). 
 34. Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow, 445 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1050 (S.D. Cal. 2020). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See infra Part III. 
 37. See Ganske v. Mensch, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151152, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2020) 
(noting that “[i]n analyzing the unique context of statements made on Internet fora, courts have 
emphasized the generally informal and unedited nature of these communications,” and adding that 
“the fact that Defendant’s allegedly defamatory statement that Plaintiff's tweet was ‘xenophobic’ . . . 
appeared on Twitter conveys a strong signal to a reasonable reader that this was Defendant’s 
opinion”); Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 339 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017) (addressing the influence 
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television news talk shows—as a genre of programming—expect hyperbole, 
thereby instantiating into defamation law the underpinnings of a ready-made 
opinion defense.  In short, it pays off in defamation law for news-oriented 
talk shows to routinely trade in over-the-top opinions and bombast rather 
than to develop a reputation for rational, even-handed debate regarding 
political issues where viewers expect fact-based assertions.  Perhaps more 
provocatively, decisions such as McDougal and Herring Networks reward 
the likes of Fox News and MSNBC for transforming news talk shows into 
infotainment spectacles.38  Part IV concludes by calling on courts to consider 
the nature of specific news talk shows on a program-by-program basis in 
defamation lawsuits rather than continue to flesh out a nascent, genre-based 
presumption that news talk shows as a whole trade in protected opinions.39 
II. THE VALUE OF POLITICAL OPINIONS IN FIRST AMENDMENT LAW AND 
THE ROLE OF CONTEXT IN THE FACT-VERSUS-OPINION DICHOTOMY 
This Part has two sections.  Section A provides a primer on the high 
value placed on opinions about political issues and matters of public concern 
in First Amendment jurisprudence.  Section B then addresses the pivotal role 
that context plays in sorting out whether an allegedly defamatory assertion is 
an actionable fact or a protected opinion. 
A. The Primacy of Political Opinions Under the First Amendment 
In both McDougal and Herring Networks, federal district courts 
protected the ability of television news talk-show hosts to give their opinions 
on politically oriented issues.40  In McDougal, the issue was whether a 
woman with whom President Trump allegedly had a year-long affair about a 
 
of the internet as a medium of expression on whether courts consider statements conveyed on it to be 
fact or opinion); see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & RonNell Andersen Jones, Of Reasonable 
Readers and Unreasonable Speakers: Libel Law in a Networked World, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 
155, 178 (2016) (observing that some libel opinions “explicitly reference the informal nature of 
social-media sites as a basis for branding allegedly libelous speech posted there as opinion”). 
 38. See CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR NATION: MEDIA, PRIVACY, AND PEERING IN MODERN 
CULTURE 103 (2000) (defining infotainment as “a bastardized hybrid of news and entertainment that 
panders to viewers’ wants rather than attempting to meet their needs”). 
 39. See infra Part IV. 
 40. See McDougal v. Fox News Network, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, at *27 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2020); Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow, 445 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1055 (S.D. 
Cal. 2020). 
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decade before he became president had later tried to extort Trump in 
exchange for her silence about the matter.41  In Herring Networks, the 
subject on which Rachel Maddow expressed her view was whether a news 
organization known for supporting President Trump was engaged in 
propaganda paid for by Russia.42 
Protecting opinions on political matters is, in fact, deeply engrained in 
First Amendment jurisprudence, not just within the realm of defamation 
law.43 Indeed, Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat contends that speech 
“advocating political opinions, no matter how objectionable . . . is clearly 
entitled to well-neigh absolute constitutional protection.”44  To wit, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has protected “Fuck the Draft” as an opinion regarding the 
merits of conscription and the war in Vietnam.45  Similarly, it has 
safeguarded the right to burn the flag of the United States of American to 
express an opinion opposing the renomination of Ronald Reagan by the 
Republican Party in 1984 for the position of the nation’s president.46 
When it comes to tort law, the Court has invoked the First Amendment 
to protect from liability members of the Westboro Baptist Church who 
expressed their opinions about “the political and moral conduct of the United 
States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, 
and scandals involving the Catholic clergy.”47  Similarly, the Court protected 
Hustler Magazine’s ability to express its opinion in a fictional ad parody that 
the Reverend Jerry Falwell was a hypocrite.48  Importantly, Falwell was 
more than just a religious leader; he was “active as a commentator on 
 
 41. See 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, at *1 (“Specifically, Ms. McDougal alleges that the host 
of the show, Tucker Carlson, accused her of extorting now-President Donald J. Trump out of 
approximately $150,000 in exchange for her silence about an alleged affair between Ms. McDougal 
and President Trump.”). 
 42. 445 F. Supp. 3d at 1046. 
 43. See Philip Hamburger, Getting Permission, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 405, 482 (2007) (“It has 
become commonplace to assume that the First Amendment primarily protects political opinion.”); 
Nancy A. Millich, Compassion Fatigue and the First Amendment: Are the Homeless Constitutional 
Castaways?, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 276 (1994) (“First Amendment protection is at its 
strongest when government seeks to regulate expression of political opinions.”). 
 44. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Details: Specific Facts and the First Amendment, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 
60 (2012). 
 45. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971). 
 46. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989). 
 47. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011). 
 48. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988). 
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politics and public affairs,”49 thus rendering the ability to issue opinions 
critical of him even more imperative.  Indeed, in ruling in favor of Hustler 
Magazine and its publisher, Larry Flynt, the Court stressed “the fundamental 
importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public 
interest and concern” under the First Amendment.50  This taps into the 
Court’s observation in the defamation case of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
that the proper remedy for opinions with which one disagrees is not to be 
found in a court of law, but rather by voicing competing opinions in the 
metaphorical marketplace of ideas.51 
Indeed, in the defamation case of Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., the 
Court clarified that “a statement of opinion relating to matters of public 
concern which does not contain a provably false factual connotation will 
receive full constitutional protection.”52  The Court in Milkovich added that 
requiring defamation plaintiffs to prove that a message states actual facts 
about them assures “that public debate will not suffer for lack of 
‘imaginative expression’ or the ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ which has 
traditionally added much to the discourse of our Nation.”53  In delivering the 
Court’s opinion, Chief Justice William Rehnquist noted that the use of 
“loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language”54 would tend to negate that an 
allegation of criminal activity was to be taken as a factual assertation. 
In short, to the extent that the courts in both McDougal and Herring 
Networks protected opinions relating to matters of political and public 
concern, the decisions fall neatly in line with a long tradition of safeguarding 
such viewpoints under the First Amendment.  As the next section indicates, 
those rulings also are in accord with judicial precedent that takes into 
account context—including the journalistic context of where a story appears 
or is broadcast—in determining if a statement should be deemed factual or 
opinionated. 
 
 49. Id. at 47. 
 50. Id. at 50. 
 51. 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974) (“Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false 
idea.  However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience 
of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”); see also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE 
SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6 (1992) (“The ‘marketplace of ideas’ is perhaps the most powerful 
metaphor in the free speech tradition.”). 
 52. 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 21. 
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B. Journalistic Context in Libel Law 
In distinguishing facts from opinions, lower courts today often consider 
multiple factors, including the journalistic or media context in which a 
statement is uttered or appears.55  Consider, for example, the state libel laws 
of New York and Arizona, both of which U.S. District Judge Mary Kay 
Vyskocil deemed relevant in McDougal.56  New York’s highest appellate 
court has ruled that, among other factors, “either the full context of the 
communication in which the statement appears or the broader social context 
and surrounding circumstances are” relevant in the fact-versus-opinion 
inquiry.57 
Under this factor, courts examine “the over-all context in which the 
assertions were made,” including “the nature of the particular forum” in 
which a statement appeared or was published.58  For example, “a letter to the 
editor of a professional journal [is] a medium that is typically regarded by 
the public as a vehicle for the expression of individual opinion.”59  Similarly, 
New York’s highest appellate court has observed that a newspaper’s 
Op Ed page is a forum traditionally reserved for the airing of ideas 
on matters of public concern.  Indeed, the common expectation is 
that the columns and articles published on a newspaper’s Op Ed 
sections will represent the viewpoints of their authors and, as such, 
contain considerable hyperbole, speculation, diversified forms of 
expression and opinion.60 
Such journalistic context standing alone, however, does not necessarily 
dictate whether a statement will be characterized as fact or opinion.  As the 
New York Court of Appeals put it, “an article’s appearance in the sections of 
 
 55. See Sack, supra note 4, at § 4:3.1, at 4–33 to 4–34 (noting that “[a] letter to the editor, . . . an 
editorial or op-ed column or broadcast, a cartoon, a critical parody or satire of a public person, a 
sports column, criticism on a radio talk show, or a critical review are ordinarily not actionable”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 56. See McDougal v. Fox News Network, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 24, 2020) (“The Court will not conduct a full choice of law analysis here . . . because . . . the 
two potential sources of law—New York and Arizona—are identical on all relevant points and 
because Defendant’s constitutional defenses may apply regardless of which state’s law governs.”). 
 57. Mann v. Abel, 885 N.E.2d 884, 886 (N.Y. 2008). 
 58. Brian v. Richardson, 660 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (N.Y. 1995). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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a newspaper that are usually dedicated to opinion does not automatically 
insulate the author from liability for defamation.”61  The specific journalistic 
forum thus simply provides a helpful—not determinative—metric or 
variable in the fact-versus-opinion analysis.62 
Of particular relevance for this Article is the ruling of a New York trial 
court in Huggins v. Povitch.63  It pivoted on allegedly defamatory remarks 
made by a guest named Melba Moore on The Maury Povich Show, a 
syndicated television talk show.64  In applying New York law, Justice 
Beverly S. Cohen observed that “when . . . statements by their context, form 
and purpose indicate that they are opinions and not assertions of fact, a libel 
action cannot be maintained.”65  In separating facts from opinions, Justice 
Cohen wrote that “the contextual approach long taken by New York” 
includes examining “the nature of the particular forum” in which the 
statements were made.66  Here, she focused both on the nature of talk shows 
generally and, more specifically, on The Maury Povich Show.67 
“The talk show format provides a forum for debate of public issues and 
the expression of opinion,” Justice Cohen reasoned, adding that it involves 
“give and take” between the host and the interviewees. 68  More specifically 
regarding The Maury Povich Show, Justice Cohen found that it “generally 
focuses upon current controversial topics of interest and debate by 
presenting invited guests with relevant backgrounds to share their 
experiences, observations and opinions with members of the studio 
audience.”69  When viewed collectively along with other variables,70 the 
nature of talk shows and The Maury Povich Show factored into Justice 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. (noting “that the forum in which a statement has been made, as well as the other 
surrounding circumstances comprising the ‘broader social setting,’ are only useful gauges for 
determining whether a reasonable reader or listener would understand the complained-of assertions 
as opinion or statements of fact”). 
 63. 1996 WL 515498 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 19, 1996). 
 64. Id. at *1. 
 65. Id. at *6. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at *7. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Among other contextual factors that were relevant for Justice Cohen on the fact-versus-
opinion issue were the specific topic under discussion—namely, a “bitter divorce”—and the fact that 
Povich and other guests repeatedly stated that the guest who uttered the allegedly defamatory 
remarks was rendering “her own personal views” about the divorce in question.  Id. 
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Cohen’s conclusion that it would be “obvious to the viewer that hotly 
contested matters are about to be discussed and that Moore’s remarks are 
likely to reflect a certain personal bias that should not be taken as objective 
fact.”71 
Another defamation case, albeit one applying California law rather than 
New York’s principles, in which a court examined the nature of a talk show 
is Condit v. Dunne.72  There, United States District Judge Peter Leisure 
considered the syndicated radio program The Laura Ingraham Show.73  He 
did so when sorting out whether allegedly defamatory comments made on 
the show by author-defendant Dominick Dunne about U.S. Congressman 
Gary Condit regarding Condit’s possible connection to the disappearance of 
Chandra Levy were ones of fact or opinion.74  Dunne had argued that the 
forum of a radio talk show is one in which listeners recognize that guests 
“offer their views on the show rather than facts.”75  Judge Leisure 
acknowledged a distinction between talk shows and news publications.76  He 
rather bluntly—and perhaps disparagingly toward Ingraham, were she to 
view herself as a truth spreader—opined, after reviewing the transcript of 
Ingraham’s interview with Dunne, that “listeners seeking the facts likely do 
not tune in to ‘The Laura Ingraham Show.’”77  Yet, just as New York courts 
consider the journalistic context or media forum where a statement is made 
to be a useful but non-controlling factor on the fact-versus-opinion issue,78 
Judge Leisure held that Dunne was not immune from liability for defamation 
simply because his comments were made on Ingraham’s show.79  Indeed, the 
judge concluded that other factors suggesting that Dunne’s comments would 
be taken literally by listeners were sufficient to override the opinion-
 
 71. Id. 
 72. 317 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  The court debated between applying the law of 
California and the law of New York before ultimately concluding “that California has a more 
significant interest in the litigation than does New York, and accordingly [the court] applies 
California’s defamation law.”  Id. at 355. 
 73. Id. at 348–50. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 362. 
 76. Id. at 362–63. 
 77. Id. at 363. 
 78. Supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
 79. See Condit, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 363 (“Defendant, however, is not immunized from a 
defamation suit simply because he recited false accusations on a talk show as opposed to a news 
program.”). 
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oriented, talk-show context on which he made them.80 
Although neither The Maury Povich Show in Huggins nor The Laura 
Ingraham Show in Condit was a cable news channel talk show, the cases 
nonetheless demonstrate that judicial consideration of the nature of a talk-
show forum in cases such as McDougal and Herring Networks is not 
unusual.  It is, instead, par for the judicial course when sussing out the 
difference between facts and opinions. 
Significantly for battles such as those involving Tucker Carlson and 
Rachel Maddow, New York courts also consider as part of the journalistic 
forum analysis the reputation of the individual who delivers or reports the 
allegedly defamatory remarks.81  This, in other words, is where it seemingly 
pays off in spades—at least when it comes to defending against defamation 
claims—for a news talk-show host to garner a reputation for engaging in 
hyperbole, sarcasm and irony, not a straight-up delivery of facts and 
opinions.  Cultivating such an on-air persona and even, perhaps, promoting 
it via advertisements and marketing might well spell the difference between 
a statement being protected as an expression of opinion rather than subject to 
liability as a factual assertion. 
Arizona’s law of defamation, which Judge Vyskocil in McDougal 
deemed “identical on all relevant points”82 with that of New York, also 
considers “the medium and context in which the statement was published”83 
in resolving the fact-versus-opinion issue.  As the Arizona Court of Appeals 
wrote in 1999, “[s]tatements that can be interpreted as nothing more than 
rhetorical political invective, opinion, or hyperbole are protected speech.”84  
In resolving whether allegedly defamatory remarks fall into one of those 
 
 80. See id. (asserting that “a reasonable listener, aware of the media frenzy and cognizant of the 
apparent nature of ‘The Laura Ingraham Show,’ nonetheless could interpret defendant’s comments 
as assertions of fact, because the comments themselves set forth specific, detailed bases for the 
accusation that plaintiff was criminally involved in Ms. Levy’s disappearance,” and adding that 
“[w]hile the setting for defendant’s comments would suggest that he merely voiced his opinion, the 
suggestion is overcome by the content of defendant’s statements, because the statements can be 
interpreted as explicit republications of actual, detailed facts”). 
 81. See Brian v. Richardson, 660 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (N.Y. 1995) (“Finally, the identity, role and 
reputation of the author may be factors to the extent that they provide the reader with clues as to the 
article’s import.”). 
 82. McDougal v. Fox News Network, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 24, 2020). 
 83. Sign Here Petitions LLC v. Chavez, 402 P.3d 457, 463 n.3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (emphasis 
in original).  Arizona embraces the State of Washington’s approach in this regard.  Id. 
 84. Burns v. Davis, 993 P.2d 1119, 1129 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). 
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safeguarded categories, the appellate court added that “consideration should 
be given to the context and all surrounding circumstances, including the 
impression created by the words used and the expression’s general tenor.”85  
In short, as in the Empire State, context—including the particular medium 
on which speech is conveyed—is part and parcel of the fact-versus-opinion 
analysis in Arizona. 
This Part illustrated that the decisions in McDougal and Herring 
Networks: 1) comport with a long First Amendment tradition of 
safeguarding political opinions, and 2) are in accord with typical judicial 
consideration in defamation cases of the journalistic or media context in 
which a statement appears or is broadcast when resolving whether it is one 
of fact or opinion.  The next Part, however, argues that both decisions 
facilitate the denigration of discourse on news talk shows by incentivizing 
hosts such as Tucker Carlson and Rachel Maddow to engage in constant 
hyperbole and exaggeration in order to better defend against defamation 
lawsuits. 
III. THE DETERIORATION OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE: AN UNSEEMLY 
FLIPSIDE OF THE FREE SPEECH VICTORIES IN MCDOUGAL AND HERRING 
NETWORKS 
Among the time-honored core rationales for protecting free expression 
under the First Amendment is the facilitation of democratic self-
governance.86  Alexander Meiklejohn was, as one scholar notes, “perhaps 
the leading proponent of the self-government theory.”87  Meiklejohn 
maintained that the dual points of ultimate interest in safeguarding political 
speech are serving “the minds of the hearers”88 and “the voting of wise 
decisions.”89  In other words, political discussion is essential to help citizens 
make informed choices.90 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. See David S. Han, Transparency in First Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY L.J. 359, 360 
(2015) (observing that one of “the foundational rationales for extending special protection to speech” 
is “its necessity as a means of effectuating democratic self-governance”). 
 87. MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 9 (2001). 
 88. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25 
(1948). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 46 (1986) (observing that for 
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Under this Meiklejohnian view, as former Yale Law School Dean 
Robert Post writes, “[t]he quality of public debate . . . is to be measured by 
its capacity to facilitate public decision-making.”91  Indeed, Meiklejohn used 
the metaphor of a traditional townhall meeting, where citizens come together 
to discuss public issues, to also suggest that a certain amount of order is 
needed to elevate the quality of this debate and to prevent a “dialectical free-
for-all.”92  Today, television news talk shows are in some ways, as the author 
of this Article contended more than two decades ago, the modern equivalent 
of townhall meetings where matters of public concern are discussed and 
debated for all to watch.93 
Decisions such as those in McDougal and Herring Networks carry the 
potential to erode the quality of political discourse by rewarding news talk-
show hosts with an opinion defense, partly because the general tone and 
tenor of their programs is loaded with colorful commentary and features 
factual exaggeration,94 and, in so doing, potentially undermine wise and 
informed political decision-making.  Certainly, viewers expect news talk-
show hosts to offer their opinions on issues.  That is a given.  But it is quite 
another thing to build into the law a contextual presumption that seemingly 
 
Meiklejohn, “the principle of free speech plays a practical role for a self-governing society, 
protecting discussion among the citizens so that they can best decide what to do about the issues 
brought before them for decision”). 
 91. ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT 
271 (1995). 
 92.  MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 88, at 23.  He added that “[t]he First Amendment . . . is not the 
guardian of unregulated talkativeness.”  Id. at 25. 
 93. Clay Calvert, Meiklejohn, Monica, & Mutilation of the Thinking Process, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 
37, 56 (1998) (asserting that “television news talk shows, call-in radio, and news websites are the 
modern-day equivalent of town meetings (even if the participants often are pundits or journalists 
themselves)” and adding that journalists, as the moderators of these virtual townhall meetings, “must 
exercise control, at the very least, because their voices at the metaphorical town meeting are 
certainly the loudest and most powerful due to their increased access to the means of mass 
communication for transmitting and propagating their views”). 
 94. See Herring Networks Inc. v. Maddow, 445 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1053 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (noting 
that “Maddow had inserted her own colorful commentary into and throughout the segment, laughing, 
expressing her dismay (i.e., saying ‘I mean, what?’) and calling the segment a ‘sparkly story’ and 
one we must ‘take in stride,’” and adding that for Maddow “to exaggerate the facts and call OAN 
Russian propaganda was consistent with her tone up to that point, and the Court finds a reasonable 
viewer would not take the statement as factual given this context”); McDougal v. Fox News 
Network, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2020) (finding that the 
“‘general tenor’ of [Carlson’s] show should then inform a viewer that he is not ‘stating actual facts’ 
about the topics he discusses and is instead engaging in ‘exaggeration’ and ‘non-literal 
commentary’”). 
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factual assertions—“really literally is paid Russian propaganda”95 and “a 
classic case of extortion”96—should be discounted to a large degree because 
they are uttered on a news talk show. 
Judge Vyskocil in McDougal seemingly was edging her way toward 
embracing such a presumption.  That was evident when she concluded that 
“overheated rhetoric is precisely the kind of pitched commentary that one 
expects when tuning in to talk shows like Tucker Carlson Tonight.”97  In 
other words, viewers expect hyperbole not just on Carlson’s show, but also, 
as the judge wrote, on shows “like” it.98 
Are the “minds of the hearers,” to use Meiklejohn’s fine phrase,99 
actually served in positive fashion by Carlson’s “bloviating for his 
audience,”100 as Judge Vyskocil suggested Carlson’s statements might be 
characterized, when it comes to “the voting of wise decisions”?101  That 
seems highly doubtful, but Carlson’s approach for conducting a news talk 
show certainly seems to serve his ratings.  The New York Times recently 
reported that “[i]n June and July [2020], Fox News was the highest-rated 
television channel in the prime-time hours of 8 to 11 p.m.  Not just on cable.  
Not just among news networks.  All of television.”102  Carlson’s show airs 
during that window at 8:00 p.m. weekdays.103 
Now, however, there’s another fiscal benefit beyond advertising-
generating ratings for the over-the-top tack of Carlson and his ilk, namely, a 
ready-made defense against defamation lawsuits that no one would believe 
that what such hosts state are factual assertions.  In other words, there are 
two economic incentives for news talk shows to gravitate toward hyperbole 
and exaggeration: attracting higher ratings and defending against pro-
plaintiff defamation verdicts.  Carlson’s and Maddow’s shows may appear 
on cable news channels where one might reasonably expect to hear facts, but 
 
 95. Herring Networks, 445 F. Supp. 3d at 1046. 
 96. McDougal, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, at *5. 
 97. Id. at *19. 
 98. Id. 
 99. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 88, at 25. 
 100. McDougal, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175768, at *17. 
 101. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 88, at 25. 
 102. Michael M. Grynbaum, Boycotted. Criticized. But Fox News Leads the Pack in Prime Time, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/09/business/media/fox-news-
ratings.html (emphasis in original). 
 103. Tucker Carlson Tonight, FOX NEWS CHANNEL, https://www.foxnews.com/shows/tucker-
carlson-tonight (last visited Oct. 15, 2020). 
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the nature of how they conduct their programs lets viewers know not to 
expect them.  In brief, the rulings in McDougal and Herring Networks, while 
safeguarding political opinions, incentivize a news talk-show environment 
that privileges bluster and fulmination over reason and rationality.  It pays 
off—at least when it comes to defending against defamation lawsuits—for 
news talk shows to charge at full speed toward the issues and people they 
attack and do so with a verbal arsenal packed with exaggeration, hyperbole, 
and sarcasm. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Supreme Court famously observed more than fifty-five years 
ago in the seminal defamation case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan that in 
the United States there is a “a profound national commitment to the principle 
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open.”104  In ruling in favor of the talk-show hosts in both McDougal and 
Herring Networks, Judge Vyskocil and Judge Bashant certainly embraced 
that spirited ethos.  Furthermore, as Part II pointed out, the judges’ logic and 
reason are fully consistent with the long-standing notion that political 
opinions are privileged under the First Amendment and that the journalistic 
context or forum where speech is conveyed is relevant in determining if that 
speech should be regarded as fact or opinion.105 
This Article, however, raised what might be considered an axiological 
question of whether, in promoting the value of robust and wide-open 
discourse on matters of political and public concern, decisions such as 
McDougal and Herring Networks denigrate the values of reasoned debate 
and an informed citizenry by encouraging hyperbole and exaggeration on 
television news talk shows.  Certainly, neither judge ruled that solely 
because the allegedly defamatory comments were uttered on such shows 
meant that they necessarily should be treated as opinions.  Each, however, 
made it clear that in taking a larger contextual approach when examining the 
fact-versus-opinion dichotomy, the news talk-show context represents an 
important contextual variable that militates toward a finding of opinion.106  
The more television news talk-show hosts engage in overheated rhetoric, 
exaggeration, and colorful commentary, the more likely this presumption is 
 
 104. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 105. Supra Part II. 
 106. See supra notes 12–13, 16 and 26–27. 
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to become cemented in defamation law and, in turn, the more likely those 
hosts are to wiggle off the hook of defamation liability. 
Defamation law, however, should not encourage a race to the bottom 
when it comes to political discourse—a race to rhetoric over reason, as it 
were.  Rather than adopting a sweeping, genre-based presumption that news 
talk shows are expected by viewers to trade in protected opinions, courts 
should carefully consider each program, along with the reputation of its host, 
on an individual basis.  That approach might at least slow the development 
of a genre-wide presumption.  Ultimately, of course, news talk-show hosts 
and their respective channels will determine the tenor of their own programs 
based on a quest for ratings, but defamation law should not add incentive to 
the denigration of discourse about matters of public concern. 
